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1.  Introduction 
Indefinite expressions show a contrast in  readings that can be informally illustrated by 
example (1). The indefinite NPs a rnonk and something have readings that contrast with 
the readings  of  serpents, headless men or men with two  heads, besides the contrast 
between singular and plural. This contrast is captured by terms speciJi'c  and non-specific, 
respectively: 
(1)  "But in the abbey there are rumors, ... strange rumors  ..." 
"Of  what sort?" 
"Strange. Let us say, rumors about a monk who decided to venture into the 
library during the night, to look for something Malachi had refused to give him, 
and he saw serpents, headless men, and men with two heads. He was nearly 
crazy when he emerged from the labyrinth ..." (89) 
A specific reading of an indefinite NP is pretheoretically characterized by the "certainty 
of the speaker about the identity of the referent", "the speaker has the referent in mind", 
"the  speaker can  identify the referent",  etc. Another version  of  this characterization is 
that the referent of  a specific NP is fixed or determined before the main predication is 
computed and that it matters which referent we select out of the set of entities that fulfill 
the description. It  is  generally assumed  that  specific  indefinites  are  "scopeless"  like 
proper names or demonstratives, i.e. they always show widest scope, and therefore are 
assumed  to  be  existentially  presupposed.  Furthermore,  the  insertion  of  a  certain 
indicates specificity. 
(2)  Pretheoretical and informal characterization cdspecificity 
(i)  certainty of the speaker about the identity of the referent 
(ii)  the referent is fixed I determined I not depending on the interpretation of 
the matrix predicate 
(iii)  specific indefinite NPs are "scopeless" or "referential terms", i.e. they 
behave as if they always have the widest scope 
(iv)  specific indefinite NPs are referential terms, i.e., they are existentially 
presupposed 
(v)  specific indefinite NPs can be paraphrased by a certain' 
The paper is suhmitted to a special issue of "Journal  of Semantics".  '  There  is  morc lexical  material  that can disambiguate  thc canuasl: Hdspclmath  (1997) investigates 
indefinite pronouns, like someone, anyone, crosslinguistically.  He (1997, 38) observes that "it  is not 
uncommon ibr languages to have two different indefinite series for specific and non-specific".  Prince 
(1981) discusses the use of English this as an specific indefinite article. 
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In  this  paper, I  argue  that  this  informally  given  list  of  characteristics  covers  only  a 
certain  subclass of  specific indefinites. While most  theories of  specificity assume all 
assumptions in  (2), my own proposal is based on the assumptions (2ii) and (2v), while I 
refute assumptions (2i), (2iii) and (2iv) as too general (in many, but not all cases, these 
characteristics follow from the assumptions (2ii) and (2v)). In  particular, I dispute the 
definition  of  specific  indefinites as "the  speaker has  the  referent  in  mind"  as  rather 
confusing if  one is working  with  a semantic theory. Furthermore,  I discuss  "relative 
specificity",  it. cases  in  which  the  specific  indefinite  does  not  exhibit  wide,  but 
intermediate  or  narrow  scope behavior.  Based  on  such data, I  argue  that  specificity 
expresses  a  referential  dependency  between  introduced  discourse  items.  Informally 
speaking, the specificity of the indefinite expression something in  (I) expresses that the 
reference of the expression depends on the reference of another expression, here, on the 
expression a monk, not the speaker. On the other hand, the specific reading of u monk in 
(I) depends on its anchoring on the speaker. Once we have determined the reference of 
u monk we have also established the reference of something. I therefore introduce the 
term "referential  anchoring" to define the semantic function of specificity. 
Some of the examples for illustrating specificity are taken from the novel "The Name 
of the Rose"  by  Umberto Eco, such  as (I). The novel  forms the background  for the 
sentences under investigation and controls the referential properties of the context. I also 
use  translations  of  one  of  the  same  sentences  as  cross-linguistic  evidence  for 
grammatical reflexes of semantic distinction (for a more detailed account toward  this 
contrastive method, see von Heusinger 2001). 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, 1 discuss the often found description 
of specific NPs as a subclass of indefinite NPs as "known/identifiable to the speaker" as 
inadequate.  Modern  semantic  theories  have  shown  (since  Karttunen  1976)  that 
definiteness cannot be explained with recourse to identifiability -  so this should not be 
done for specificity. In  section 3, I discuss the morphological marking of  specificity in 
Turkish. I assume that the specificity marker in Turkish is more reliable than the indirect 
marking  in  languages  such  as  English  or  Italian.  In  section  4,  I  present  different 
instances  of  what  are  called  specific  cases,  such  as  scopal  specificity,  epistemic 
specificity, partitive  specificity, and  relative  specificity. In  section, 5, I present three 
familiCs of semantic approaches to definiteness and specificity: the pragmatic approach 
assumes that specificity is a question of  scope and additional  pragmatic information - 
from  the  early  beginnings,  this  "additional"  information  is  also  represented  as  a 
semantic structure, see Jackendoff's  (1972) "modal  structure".  The lexical  ambiguity 
approach assumes that there are two indefinite articles, an existential and a referential, 
which  then  yield  non-specific  and  specific readings,  respectively. Discourse theories 
present  definiteness  as  familiarity,  but  do not  treat  specific  indefinites  in  particular. 
Extension of discourse theories try to capture the specificity contrast. However, all these 
theories are restricted with respect to the phenomena they describe. This is shown with 
data from Turkish -  there are more cases of morphological  marking of specificity than 
these theories predict. 
In  section 6, I present a more general theory of specificity that is based on the notion 
of  "referential  anchoring"  at  the  level  of  discourse  representation:  a  specific  NP  is 
anchored to another discourse entity. Thus, the specific expression is assigned the same 
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2.  Specificity and definiteness 
In this section, I discuss the relation between definiteness and specificity; in particular I 
argue  first  that  specificity  is  not  a  simply  a  subcategory  of  indefinite NPs,  but  an 
independent category that can therefore form a cross-classification. Second I motivate 
that  specificity  is  to  be  analyzed  in  terms  of  an  additional  structure  which  I  call 
"referential  struclure" of a text. 
The category "specificity"  was  introduced for indefinite NPs  as an  analogy to the 
category  "referentiality"  for  definite  NPs.  Quine  (1960,  330,  141ffl  discusses  the 
referential  properties of definite NPs on  examples like (3): The definite NP the dean 
behaves differently  in  the scope of  an  intensional verb like look ,for. He (1960, $31, 
146ff) observes that  a very similar ambiguity can  be constructed with  indefinite NPs, 
such as in  (4). This contrast  was  later termed  specific vs.  non-specific  (Baker  1966, 
Fillmore 1967): 
(3)  John is looking for the dean. 
a.  ... whoever it might be  [non-referential] 
b.  ..., namely for Smith, who is happens to be the dean.  [referential] 
(4)  John is looking for a pretty girl. 
a.  ... whoever he will meet, he will take her to the movies  [non-specific] 
b.  ..., namely for Mary.  [specific] 
The intuitive concept of specificity (see (2)) extremely quickly spread over the linguistic 
community. However it is most often understood as secondary referential  property of 
NPs that applies only to indefinite NPs. Additionally it  has become  very common to 
describe or define specificity in terms of  identifiability by  speaker and hearer, as in (5). 
According to this view, definite NPs are used if both the speaker and hearer can identify 
the referent, specific indefinite NPs, if only the speaker can identify the referent, while 
non-specific indefinite indicates that none of  them can identify the referent: 
(5)  The "identifiability"  criteria for definiteness and specificity 
[  iderztffiecl by  1 definite  1 indefinite  I indefinite 
This view is often ascribed to Givdn (1978), who however gives a more  differentiated 
picture. First, he (1978, 293) defines specificity -  what he calls 'referentiality' -  in the 
following way: 
speaker 
hearer 
1 .I. Rereferentiality [= specificity, KvH] 
In  the terms used her, referentiality  is  a semantic property of  nominals. In involves, 
roughly, the speaker's intent to  'refer to'  or 'mean' a nominal expression to have non- 
empty  references - i.e.  to  'exist'  - within  a  particular  universe  of  discourse. 
Conversely, if  a nominal  is  'non-referential' or  'generic'  the speaker does not have a 
commitment to  its existence with  the relevant universe of  discourse. Rather, in  the 
latter case the speaker is engaged in discussing the genus or its properties, but does not 
commit hidherself to the existence of  any specific individual member of  that genus. 
(+ spec) 
+ 
+ 
spec. 
+ 
. 
non-spec 
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In  this  definition, specificity is defined  in  terms of  (i) existential presupposition  (cf. 
(2iv)) and (ii) in terms of the type of the referent (individuals vs. predicates). The latter 
aspect is generally taken to distinguish between particular vs. generic readings of NPs. 
Givdn (1978, 296) also makes clear that he understands definiteness as a property of 
linguistic  discourse  structure, rather  than  of  the  world:  "The  notions  'definite'  and 
'indefinite',  as far as referential  nominals are concerned, are used here strictly in  their 
discourse-pragmatic  sense, i.e.  'assumed by the speaker to be uniquely  identifiable to 
the  hearer'  vs.  'not  so assumed',  respectively."  However, the  definition  in  terms of 
attitudes of the speaker towards the mental representation of the hearer is quite complex, 
making this definition quite difficult to work with. Therefore, the simplified picture (3) 
is generally used. Haspelmath (1997, 46) uses the categorization (6) for distinguishing 
different classes of indefinite  pronoun^:^ 
(6) (In-)definiteness, (non-)specificity and knowledge of the speaker (Haspelmath 1997) 
The categorization  in  (5) is also used in  the discussion of Dijferential Object Marking 
(= DOM from  German Diflereiztielle  Objektnzurkier~mg,  Bossong  1985). DOM is the 
cross-linguistically widespread phenomenon that describes the morphological marking 
of a subclass of direct objects. One example of this form of object marking is discussed 
in  section  3 for Turkish. In  general, DOM predicts  that  case marking  (of the direct 
object)  operates  on  a  scale.  Bossong  (1985, 6) proposes  the  "Skala  der  Referenz- 
merkmale" ("scale  of  referential features"),  as in  (7). Aissen (2000, 7) builds this scale 
into a larger "Definiteness Scale" (8): 
(7)  Skala der Referenzmerkmale (Bossong 1985) 
[id egoA[id  tu] > [id egoA[-id tu] > [-id egoA[-id  tu] 
definite 
known to speaker 
and hearer 
indefinite 
non-specific  I  specific 
(8)  Definiteness Scale (or Hierarchy) (Aissen 2000) 
Pronoun > Name > Definite > Indefinite > NonSpecific 
unknown to the speaker 
There are two tacit assumptions of  this view on  the relation  between  definiteness and 
specificity  that  I  think  are  incorrect:  (i)  definiteness  is  explained  in  terms  of 
identifiability of the referent, and (ii) specificity is a subcategorization of indefinite NPs 
(which means  that  there  are no  non-specific  definite  NPs).  There  is  no  convincing 
evidence for either of the claims; rather the research has  given  plan  evidence for the 
contrary.  Definiteness  (and  thus  specificity)  cannot  be  reduced  to  the  concept  of 
identification,  as  it  is  illustrated  by  the  following  examples.  The  definite  NPs  tlze 
rightr?ous  nzan  and the doors  in the two fragments (9) and (10) cannot be identified by 
the speaker  and hearer, they do not even refer to identifiable objects, and in  (10) the 
definite NPs do not even refer to any existent object. Example (9) nicely illustrates that 
the  NP  is  definite  because  it  is  anaphorically  linked  to  a  discourse  item  already 
introduced (but not necessarily to an  identified referent  "in  the world"). The indefinite 
known to the 
speaker 
Haspelmath  has  the  three-way  distinction  for  indefinites:  non-specific;  specific + unknown  to  the 
spcaker; and  specific and  known  lo the speaker. This secms to correspond to the  English  unyone, 
sonleone [non-specific], someone [specific]. 
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NP a secret in  (I I) has a clear specific reading, but it cannot be identified by speaker or 
hearer (this is warranted by the plot of  the story). On the other side, the two indefinite 
NPs one of  my nzonks  and an equally terrible sin in  (12) have referents that are well- 
known to both the speaker and the hearer (it is the dead monk Adelmo and the sin of 
homosexuality, respectively). In  a theory  of  identifiability, one would  expect definite 
NPs  instead of  the indefinites. This can  only be explained  in  the  view  of  discourse 
representation:  the  two  referents  cannot  be  linked  to  a  discourse  referent  already 
established -  that is why indefinite NPs are used. 
(9)  [...I And I know that he [= the Evil One] can impel his victims to do  evil in such 
a way that the blame falls on a righteous man, and the Evil One rejoices then as 
the righteous man is burned in the place of his succubus. (29) 
(10)  William asked him whether he would be locking the doors. 
"There are no doors that forbid access to the scriptorium from the kitchen and 
the refectory. or to the library from the scriptorium."  (85) 
(1 I)  The fact is, Benno said, he had overheard a dialogue between Adelmo and 
Berengar in  which Berengar, referring to a secret Adelmo was asking him to 
reveal, proposed a vile barter, which even the most innocent reader can imagine. 
(1 37) 
(12)  It would already be serious enough if one of my monks had stained his soul with 
the hateful sin of suicide. But I have reason to think that another of them has 
stained himself with an equally terrible sin. (33) 
There  is  no  convincing  definition  of  definiteness  (and  specificity)  in  terms  of 
identifiability.  I will  assume here  that  definiteness expresses the discourse pragmatic 
property of familiarity (Karttunen 1976, Heim 1982, Kamp 198  1, and following work in 
discourse semantics). The second question is then  what  is the nature of  specificity. 1 
assume that specificity is a "referential  property"  of NPs. This property cuts across the 
distinction  of  definite vs.  indefinite, like genericity. Prince  (1981, 231) observes that 
both definite and indefinite NPs exhibit different "ways of referring": ' 
(1 3)  a.  A body was found in the river yesterday.  specific 
b.  A tiger has stripes.  generic 
c.  John is u plunzber.  predicative 
d.  I  never saw u two-lzeuded man.  attributive 
[= non-specific, KvH] 
e.  He won't say a word.  negative polarity 
idiom piece 
3  Prince  (1981, 231: "In  their  most usual reading, only  the italicized NP in  (la) [= (13a), KvH] can 
actually he  said  to  be  .specific. The italicized NPs  in  (Ih-e) [= (13b-el. KvHl  are all  non-specific, 
though  of  different  typcs  (generic,  predicative,  attributive,  and  negative  polarity  idiom-piece, 
respectively).  However, definite NPs  exhibit a similar  range of  undcrstandings".  My  use  of  "non- 
specific" correlates to Prince's  "attributive"  since I assume that specific as well  as non-specific NPs 
arc "individualized",  i.e. refer to one individual. Klaus von Heusinger 
(14)  a.  The body was found in the river yesterday.  specific 
[= referential, KvH] 
b.  The tiger has stripes.  generic 
c.  Ronald is the president.  predicative 
d.  They'll never find the man thut will please  them.  attributive 
[= non-specific, KvH] 
e.  He doesn't mean  the slightest thing to me.  negative polarity 
idiom piece 
The exact nature of  specificity will  be  discussed  in section  6. Informally, specificity 
mirrors a more fine-grained structure of  referential relations between  the items used in 
the  discourse  (what  Jackendoff  1972  calls  "modal  structure").  This  structure  is 
independent  of  the  discourse  pragmatic  status  of  the  NP  (expressed  in  terms  of 
definiteness) and the scopal behavior of that NP. Specificity affects definite NPs as well 
as  indefinite  NPs.  A  specific  NP  indicates  that  the  associated  discourse  item  is 
referentially  anchored  to  another  discourse  item,  and  therefore,  inherits  the  scopal 
properties of its anchor (among other properties).4 
(15)  Cross-classification of definiteness and specificity 
operators  ( spec. def. NPs 
referentially anchored to 
discourse referents 
referentially bound by 
This picture is confirmed by the early literature on specificity where often a comparison 
was made between  non-specific indefinite NPs and attributive readings of definite NPs, 
on the one hand, and specific indefinite NPs and referential  definite NPs on the other. 
(cf. Partee  1970). However, the comparison was mainly explained in terms of  scope or 
in terms of  an ambiguity between quantifiers and a referential operator (see section 4.1 
and 4.2) 
3.  Grammatical encoding of specificity 
discourse old 
referential or specific 
def. NPs 
attributive  or non- 
As opposed to definiteness, there are no sets of  specific vs. non-specific articles in Indo- 
European  languages.  This  probably  caused  the  assumption  of  the  purely  pragmatic 
nature of  specificity in contrast to the semantic nature of  definiteness (see section 4.1). 
However,  there  are  many  other  languages  that  mark  specificity  lexically  or 
morphologically.  Lyons  (1999, 59)  summarizes  observations  from  other  languages: 
"Articles  marking specificity, or something close to specificity, rather than definiteness 
are  fairly  widespread."  Specificity  is  also  often  mentioned  with  respect  to  DOM 
("differentiated  object marking",  see above). Bossong (1985, viii) notes that there are 
discourse new 
specific  indef. NPs 
non-spec. indef. NPs 
9  assulne that every NP receives an index that must be either anchared to a discourse item or bound by 
some discourse operator (such as negation, intensional vcrhs ctc.). The second condition  is necessary 
since  h<,lh dclinitc  and  indclinite  NPs  are  terms  which  can  servc  as  antecedents  for  anaphoric 
prtlnouns. In an alternative view, indefinites are predicates thal can receive a "singular termm-reading 
conlextual force. However, in  such a view thcre is no uniformity  of definite and  indefinite NPs. See 
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more than 300 languages from all over the world that exhibit DOM. In the remainder of 
this  section,  I  present  data  from  Turkish  where  specificity  is  reflected  in  the 
morphological marking of the direct object (which is often subsumed under DOM) and 
of the subject in embedded sentences.' 
3.1.  Turkish 
Turkish is an agglutinating and suffixing language. The main verb is sentence final and 
rnost suffixes are phrase-final. The unmarked  word order is: subject > indirect object > 
direct object >predicate, as illustrated in (16): 
(1 6)  ressam biz-e  resim-ler-i  goster-di 
artist  lpl-dat  picture-pl-acc  show-di.past 
'An artist showed us picture' 
Embedded  clauses  are  realized  by  nominalized  predicates.  The  subject  of  such 
nominalized predicates is in  the genitive (with or without a genitive case ending -  see 
below).  The  genitive  shows  agreement  on  the  nominalized  predicate  in  form  of 
possessive suffix. Embedded sentence can be arguments of superordinated predicates, as 
illustrated in (17): 
(17)  [Turkiye'nin, buyuk 01-dug-unl]-u  hil-ir-im 
Turkey-gen  big  be-NOM-3posI-acc  know-aor- lsg 
'I know the big-being of Turkey' = 'I know that Turkey is large' 
3.2.  Turkish object marking 
A language specific implementation of  specificity is found in  Turkish  (Kornfilt 1997, 
219fn. Turkish does not have a definite article, but  an  indefinite article hir, which is 
derived from the numeral bir, but which differs in distribution. The direct object can be 
realized  by  the  absolut(ive)  without  case endings  or by the  accusative  with  the case 
ending -I. Thus the definite reading of  a book is generally expressed by the accusative 
case ending, as in (18b), while the indefinite reading is realized by the indefinite article 
plus  the  absolutive,  as  in  (18c).  However,  the  combination  of  the  markers  for 
definiteness  and  indefiniteness  in  (18d) expresses  an  indefinite  specific  NP.  (18a) 
expresses a reading  that  comes close to  an  incorporated one (see Lewis  1967, Dede 
1986, Kornfilt 1997 among others) 
(18)  a.  (hen)  kitah  oku-du-m  incorporated 
I  book  read-past- lsg  "I was book-reading" 
b.  (hen)  kitub-z  oku-du-m  [definite] 
I  book-acc  read-past-l sg  "I read the book." 
c.  (hen)  bir kitup  oku-du-m  [indefinite] 
I  a book  read-past- l sg  "I read a book." 
This ohservation goes hack to Kornfilt (1997). I am not aware of othel- work that comparcs DOM with 
thc marking of suhjects in embedded sentence. Kornfilt (1997) assumes that the marking of specificity 
is not restl.icled to the direct object but also to the suhject. However, this is only visible in embedded 
suhjects since the suhject of the matrix scntence never receives a case. Klaus von Heusinger 
d.  (hen)  bir kitab-r  oku-du-m  [indef. spec.] 
I  a book-acc  read-past-lsg  "I read a certain book." 
Direct  objects with  case endings can only receive a specific reading, as illustrated in 
(19a) and (l9b) from Dede (1986, 158):' 
(19)  a.  Bir  ogrenci  an-yor-um.  Bulan-ml-yor-um 
a  student  look-for-prog-  l sg  find-NEG-aor-I sg 
'I am looking for a student. I can't find him'  [specific] 
'I arn looking for a student. I can't find one'  [non-specific] 
b.  Bir ogrenci-yi  ari-yor-um.  Bulanm~yorum 
a  student-acc  look-for-prog-1 sg  find-NEG-aor- 1  sg 
'I am looking for a student. I can't find him'  [specific] 
(*I can't find one)  [non-specific] 
3.3.  Turkish subject marking 
A  similar contrast exists for the subject of embedded  sentences. The predicate of  an 
embedded sentence in Turkish is a nominalized form that  shows agreement with the 
subject,  realized by the possessive  marker -I.  The subject is realized  in the genitive, 
either with the case ending -In, or without the combination of the indefinite article hir 
and the genitive case marks a specific subject (Kornfilt 1997, 219ff, ex. (762)=(20a)). 
Note that the non-specific subject tends to be closer to the predicate, while the specific 
one appears more clause-initial. 
(20)  a.  [koy-ii  haydut  bas-tlg-1n1-I  duy-du-m 
[village-acc  robber  raid-Nom-poss.3sgl-acc  hear-Past- 1 sg 
"I heard that robbers raided the village" 
b.  [bir haydut-un  koy-ii  bas-tlg-1n1-I  duy-du-m 
[a robber-gen  village-acc raid-Nom-poss.3sgl-acc  hear-Past-1 sg 
"I heard that a certain robber raided the village" 
3.4.  A contrastive view 
Even though the data are more complex than the given picture (see footnote 7), I assume 
that the case marking of the direct object and of the embedded subject in combination 
with the indefinite article is a fairly good indicator of a specific indefinite NP. This test 
6  Dede (1986, 157) observes that the condition for case marking of the direct object are more complex. 
Among other conditions, movement is marked hy Lhe  case: "The direct object which is removed from 
its unmarked  position, that is, from immediately preverbal  position  Tor  some rcason such as focusing 
or contrast of another constituent always takes the ACC case endings." 
(i)  Bizi~n  ev-de  ~ay-I  her zaman  Aytiil  yap-ar 
our  house-III~  ica-acc  always  Aytiil  make-aor 
'Aytiil always makes the tea in our family' 
(ih)  *Bizim ev-dc  C~Y  her raman  Aytiil  yap-ar 
Johanson (1977, cited from Johanson 1990, 181) had already observed this: ,,In dem Beitrag Johanson 
(1977, ...  ) wird geltend gemacht, dal3 die vom Akkusativsuff'ix gelragene Idce der ,Spczifiaitht' nus in 
dcr Position unmittelbar vor dcm regierenden Verb systematisch realisicrt werden kiinne und da8 der 
Akkusativ sonst meist als reiner Objektindikator funktioniere." Therefor, I usc only examples with the 
direct object in its base position. Specificity and Definiteness in Sentence and Discourse Structure 
is  in any  case more  robust  than  the  more  indirect  indicators  in  English  or Italian, 
illustrated by the translation in (21). The context of the novel is that one monk indicates 
to  William  of  Baskerville  (the medieval  Sherlock Holmes) that he knows  something 
(specific!), but that he is not ready to disclose it: "[ ...I But in the abbey there are rumors, 
... strange rumors ..." -  "Of  what sort?" 
(21) a.  i  "Strane. Diciamo, di un monaco che nottetempo ha voluto avventurarsi in 
.  . 
11  biblioteca, per cercare qualcosa che Malachia non aveva voluto dargli, e ha  .  . . 
111  visto serpenti, uomini senza testa, e uomini con due teste. Per poco non 
iv  usciva pazzo dal labirinto ..." 
b.  i  "Strange. Let us say, rumors about a monk who decided to venture into the 
.  . 
11  library during the night, to look for something Malachi had refused to give  . .  . 
111  him, and he saw serpents, headless men, and men with two heads. He was 
iv  nearly crazy when he emerged from the labyrinth ..." 
c.  i  Garip dylenti-ler ornegin,  [bir rahib-inl geceyarlsl, [[Mala~hi'nin~ 
kendine 
strange rumor-pl  for example, [a monk-gen  midnight  [[M.-gen 
himself-dat  .  . 
11  ver-mek  iste-me-dig-ill  bir kitab-I  bul-mak  iqin]  gizlice 
...  give-inf  want-NEG-NOM-poss.3sgl a  book-acc  find-inf  to  1  secretly 
111  kitapl~g-a  girmey-e  kalkiq-tig-I,]  (...)  dair  soylenti-ler 
library-&at  enter-to  venture-NOM-poss.3sgl  about  rumor-PI 
'There are strange rumors, for example rumors about [a monk midnights 
secretly into the library venturing [to find a book [that Malachi did not want 
to give him]]]' 
The context of  the novel  strongly suggests that the speaker knows the referent of  the 
indefinite  NP  a  nzonWun  monaco  but  not  the  referent  of  the  indefinite  pronoun 
sonzething/qualcoso. The specificity of  the indefinite a monk  is indicated  in  different 
ways: In the English translation the anaphoric pronoun he in  (2lbiii) doesn't seem to be 
embedded under the NP rumors. If that is the case then the indefinite NP u monk must 
be  specific, otherwise it could not  serve as antecedent for the pronoun.  In  the Italian 
original  the indicative mood  of  the relative clause (ha voluto) indicates that the head 
noun  un monaco is specific. This is confirmed by the Turkish translation,  where the 
subject hir  rahih-in of  the embedded sentence that  ends in  kalkzht~gz  shows double 
marking (indefinite article plus case ending). 
Note  that  the  Turkish  translation  bir  kitabz  for  the  Italian  yuulcosa  or  English 
something in  line (ii) is marked as specific. The specificity of this NP is confirmed by 
the setting of  the novel  (and the lexical meaning of  the word involved): Malachi (the 
librarian) can  only refuse to give something to the monk  if  the monk had  asked for a 
specific  thing.  In  Italian,  the  predicate  uvevu  voluto  in  the  relative  clause is  in  the 
indicative, and thus  indicating that the head  noun qualcosa is specific. In  English, the 
relative clause modifying something contains the proper name Malachi, which again is a 
good indication that the indefinite pronouns is linked to the referent of that proper name. 
In  comparing  the  three  languages, Turkish  marks  specificity clearly,  whereas  subtle 
indicators in English or Italian must be looked for. Klaus van Heusingcr 
3.5.  Unsolved cases 
Specificity is marked in Turkish by the combination of case suffixes and the indefinite 
article. However, a close inspection of  all those cases where we find case marking and 
the indefinite article reveals that we cannot always account for this marking in terms of 
specificity defined as "the speaker has in mind" or as wide scope of the indefinite. This 
was  already the  case  in  (21) with something/qualcose/biv kitabz. The following two 
cases are similar: the indefinite NP bir kitabz in  (22b) cannot be known to the speaker 
(that would contradict the plot of the story) but is still marked a specific. The NP in (23) 
is embedded under the conditional expressed by the conditional suffix -se. It  would not 
make sense to give wide scope to the indefinite or give it a referential reading, still it is 
marked as specific. 
(22)  a.  The day before, Benno had said he would be prepared to sin in order to 
procure a rare book. He was not lying and not joking. (1 83) 
b.  Bir  giin  once Benno az  bul-un-ur  bir  kitab~  elde etmek  i~in 
One day  before  B.  rare find-pass-SP  a  book-acc  procure-inf  to 
seve  seve  giinah i~leye-ceg-in-i  soyle-mi~ti. 
with  pleasure  sin  commit-fut-3sg-acc  say-mih.past. 
Yalan  soyle-mi-yor-du;  hakada  yap-ml-yor-du. (261) 
lie  say-NEG-prog-di.past; joke also  make-NEG-prog-di.past 
(23)  Bir rahip  bir kitab-I almak  iste-r-se,  (...I 
a monk  a book-acc  take  want-Aor-Cond  (...) 
'If a monk wants to take a book (...)' 
These examples can, of course, be understood as showing that the combination of case 
suffix and indefinite article doesn't always indicate specificity. However, as long as we 
do  not  know  what  kind  of  phenomena  we  are  ready  to  subsume  under  the  term 
vpecificity we cannot resolve this problem. 
4.  Types of specificity 
In  the discussion of  specificity, different kinds of  specific indefinites are distinguished. 
The  main  distinction  is  organized  into  two dimensions:  scope and  referentiality.  A 
prototypical specific indefinite is assumed to have wide scope and a referential reading. 
Depending on  the  theory, the one or  other  aspect  is  more  focused  upon.  Following 
Farkas  (1995),  I  present  the  following  groups:  (i)  scopal  specific  indefinites,  (ii) 
epistemic specific indefinite, and (iii) partitive specific indefinite. I discuss an additional 
group (iv) which I call "relative specific indefinites". 
4.1.  Scopal specificity 
Classically, the contrast between a specific and a non-specific reading of an indefinite is 
illustrated by  examples such as (24). The historical  reason  for this is that  in the same 
context definite NPs show different readings (see (3) and (4) above).'  The paraphrases 
1  It is intresting to note that many people who illustrate specificity with this examplc deny that it is also 
a category for definite NPs (see the discussion in section 2). 
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in  (24a)  and (24b) motivate the specific and non-specific readings  in  term of  scope, 
respectively. (24a) can be continuEd with the (24a') since the pronoun her refers back to 
the existential quantifier that is outside of  the scope of  want.  In  (24b), the quantifier is 
inside  the  scope, thus  a  link  to  a pronoun  is  not  possible.  Therefore, we  can  only 
continue as in (24b'): 
(24)  John wants to marry a Norwegian. 
a.  There is a Norwegianl, and John wants to marry her1 . 
a'.  He met herl last year. 
b.  John wants that there is a Norwegian1 and he marries herl 
b'.  He will move to Norway to try to achieve this goal. 
The  interaction  of  the  indefinite  with  other  operators  can  also  be  illustrated  with 
negation, as in  (25), with a universal  quantifier, as in  (26), or it can interact with more 
than  one other operator, as in  (26) and (27). In  these cases we expect three readings, 
which the reader can easily work out. 
(25)  Bill didn't see a misprint.  (Karttunen 1976) 
a.  There is a misprint which Bill didn't see. 
b.  Bill saw no misprints. 
(26)  Bill intends to visit a museum every day.  (Karttunen 1976) 
(27)  Luce expects Pinch to ask him for a book.  (Kasher & Gabbay 1976) 
Karttunen (1976, 377) observes that we can disambig~~ate  a sentence with an indefinite 
and  another operator  by  anaphoric  linkage. While the  indefinite  NP  in  (28)  can  be 
specific or non-specific, it can only be specific in (29).' 
(28)  Harvey courts a girl at every convention 
(29)  Warvey courts a girl at every convention. She is pretty 
4.2.  Epistemic specificity 
The contrast described in  the last section arises in the presence of other operators such 
as negation, universal quantifier or verbs of propositional attitudes. An analysis in terms 
of  scope  seems  to  work  well.  However,  there  are  examples  that  show  the  same 
(intuitive) contrast, but do not contain other operators. In  the specific reading of (30), 
we can continue with (30a), while the non-specific reading can be continued by (30b). 
Kasher & Gabbay (1976) mention examples (31)-(33), where they state a clear contrast 
between a specific and a non-specific reading. This contrast is also often described as 
referential vs. non-referential  terms. The specific indefinite refers to its referent directly, 
while the non-specific indefinite depends on  the interpretation of  other expressions in 
the context. 
X  There are ~xccptions  ~IJ  this  rule,  if  lhe conlinuation includes  a silnilar quantifier as the antecedent 
sentence: 
(i)  Harvey courts ri girl at every convention. She always comcs to the hanquet with him. Klaus von Heusinger 
(30)  A student in Syntax 1 cheated on the exam  (Fodor & Sag 1982) 
a.  His name is John 
b.  We are all trying to figure out who it was 
(3 1)  I talked with a magician and so did Uri.  (Kasher & Gabbay 1976) 
(32)  Olivia is married to a Swede, but she denies it 
(33)  A book is missing from my library. 
4.3.  Partitive specificity 
Milsark  (1974) argues  that  indefinite NPs  can  either  receive  a  weak  (or  existential) 
interpretation or a strong (or prepositional)  interpretation. In  (34) the indefinite some 
ghost  recelves  a  weak  interpretation,  but  gets  a  strong  interpretation  in  (35) 
(presupposing that  there are other groups of  ghosts.)  The reading in  (35) is generally 
called "partitive". 
(34)  There are some ghosts in this house 
(35)  Some ghosts live in the pantry; others live in the kitchen 
Enq (1 99  1, 5f) observes that this contrast between a partitive and a non-partitive reading 
of  indefinite NPs is in  the same way morphologically marked as the contrast between 
specific  vs.  non-specific  indefinite  (see  section  3  above for the  details  of  Turkish). 
Given (36) as the background knowledge for the participants, the speaker can utter (36a) 
expressing the partitive meaning: the two girls must be  included in  the named set. In 
Turkish this is marked by  the accusative suffix  -i on the direct object. Continuing with 
(36b) (without the suffix), the two girls are not included in the mentioned set. (36a) is 
equivalent to (37) with an overt partitive: 
(36)  Oda-m-a  birkaq  ~ocuk  gir-di 
room-poss. l sg-dat  several  child  enter-di.past 
'Several children entered my room' 
a.  Iki klz-1  tanl-yor-du-m 
two girl-acc  know-prog-di.past-1 sg 
'I knew two (of the) girls' 
b.  Iki k~z  anl-yor-du-m 
two girl  know-prog-di.past- lsg 
'I knew two girls' 
[partitive] 
[non-partitive] 
(37)  IGz-lar-dan  iki-sin-i  tani-yor-dum  [overt partitive construction] 
girl-pl-abl  two-pass.3sg-acc  know-prog-di.past-lsg 
'I knew two of the girls' 
Enq claims that partitives denote an unknown subset of a given set, here, two girls from 
the set of given girls. Partitives always exhibit wide scope since the set from which they 
pick some elements out is already mentioned. This means that partitives are complex 
expressions that  are formed  by  an  indefinite choice from a definite set. This view  is Specificity and Definitencss in Scntence and Discourse Structure 
supported  by  the contrast  between  the following three partitive expressions from the 
novel The Name ($the  Rose: the partitive one qfmy nzonks in (38) has a specific reading 
-  it refers to the monk Adelmo, who has been found dead at the beginning of the story. 
In (39), the partitive is rather non-specific, while in  (40), it is a negative one. 
(38)  "It would already be serious enough if one of my monks had stained his soul 
with the hateful sin of suicide. But I have reason to think that another of them 
has stained himself with an equally terrible sin." (33) 
(39)  "In  the first place, why one of the monks?  I11 the abbey there are many other 
persons, grooms, goatherds, servants  ..."  (33) 
(40)  The library was laid out on a plan which has remained obscure to all over the 
centuries, and which none of the monks is called upon to know. (37) 
So it seems that partitives are rather formed by two independent referential functions: 
the first can be specific, non-specific, negative, etc., while the second must be definite. I 
therefore, do not include them in the investigation of specific indefinites proper.9 
4.4.  Relative specificity 
There  are  indefinite  NPs  that  are  neither  wide  scope  nor  referential,  but  are  still 
"specific".  Higginbotham (1987, 64) illustrates this by the examples (41) and (42): 
"In  typical cases specific uses are said to  involve a referent that the speaker 'has in 
mind.'  But this condition seems much  too strong. Suppose my  friend George says to 
me, 'I met  with a certain student of  mine today.' Then I can report the encounter to a 
third party by  saying, 'George said that he met with a certain student of  his today,' and 
the 'specificity' effect is felt, although I am in no position to say which student George 
met with." 
(41) George: "I met a certain student of mine" 
(42)  James: "George met a certain student of  his." 
Hintikka (1986) had made a similar observation in his discussion of  the expression a 
certain. In  (43), he  shows that  the  specific  indefinite  u  certain  +t'omaa  can  receive 
narrow  scope with  respect to  the universal  quantifier  and still  be  specific: there is a 
specific woman for each man. Hintikka suggests that the specific indefinite NP is to be 
represented  by  a  Skolem-function  that  assigns to  each  man  the  woman  who  is  his 
mother. With  Farkas  (1997) we  can  describe  the  dependency  of  the  specific  NP  a 
certain woman from the universal quantifier every marl  by the concept of "co-variation:" 
Farkas builds this dependency into the interpretation process: The value for the specific 
indefinite woman co-varies with the value for man. In  other words, once the reference 
for  man  is  fixed  (during  the  process  of  interpreting  the  universal  quantifier),  the 
reference  for  the  specific  indefinite  is  simultaneously  fixed.  In  (43b), I  informally 
'  Lyons  (1999,  100) expresses  a  similar  view  with  respect  to  thc  partitive  article  in French:  "The 
partitive  arlicle is almost certainly  best regarded  as n  genuine partitive construction, and not  as an 
indefinite article." 
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indicate this  by  indexing  the  indefinite NP with  the variable  bound by  the universal 
quantifier.'' 
(43)  According to Freud, every man unconsciously wants to marry a certain 
woman -  his mother. (Hintikka 1986) 
a.  Vx [Man(x) -> Wants(x, marry(x, f(x))] 
with f: Skolem function from men into their mothers 
b.  Vx [Man(x) -> Wants(x, marry(x, [a woman],] 
These observations  motivate a revision of the pre-theoretical description of specificity 
as  the  "certainty  of  the  speaker  about  the  referent".  It  was  shown  that  a  specific 
indefinite NP need not  depend on the speaker or the context of  utterance, it can also 
depend on other linguistic entities like the universal quantifier even: man in  (43) or on 
the proper  name George in  (42). This was the same dependency we have informally 
stated in  (I), where the indefinite pronoun something depends on the indefinite NP a 
monk. In  thC following sections, I assume that specificity is a marker for an expression 
that is r<ferentiallv unchored to another expression, rather than "absolutely"  related to 
the speaker. Before I give my formal reconstruction  of this idea, I present some current 
approaches to specificity. 
5.  Semantic theories of specificity 
In  the following I discuss three semantic approaches to definiteness and specificity: (i) 
the pragmatic  view;  (ii) the lexical  ambiguity view,  and  (iii) the discourse semantics 
approach. The first two theories share the assumptions that definite and indefinite NPs 
are  both  quantifier  phrases.  The  difference  between  the  quantifier  phrases  is  the 
uniaueness  condition  of  the  definite  article.  The theories  differ  in the conceotion  of 
specificity:  the  pragmatic  approach  explains  scopal  specificity  in  terms  of  scope 
behavior  of  the quantifiers  involved,  while  epistemic  specificity is  seen  as  a purely 
pragmatic notion.-The lexical ambiguity view assumes that there are two interpretations 
of  indefinite NPs: an existential and a referential. The latter has the same properties as 
other  referential  terms  such  as  proper  names  and  deictic  expressions.  Discourse 
semantics, on the other hand, perceives the difference between  definite and indefinite 
NPs  not  in  the  uniqueness  condition  but  in  the  discourse-pragmatic  familiarity 
condition. A definite expression is linked to an  already introduced discourse item, while 
a  indefinite  NP  is  not.  Specificity  is  primarily  treated  as  an  irregular  behavior  of 
indefinites - indefinites  that  can  introduce  their  discourse  referents  in  any  of  the 
superordinated boxes. 
All  three  approaches  in  their  classical  versions  are unable  to  account for relative 
specific indefinites. However, there are extensions of  each of the mentioned approaches 
that  are intended to cover exactly these cases: Schwarzschild (2000) and Yeom  1997 
suggest  domain  restrictions  for  the  pragmatic  approach,  Kratzer  (1998)  proposes 
"'  Farkas focuses on a sorncwhlll different case, namely on indefinites in the scope ot'sorne operator. She 
describes  then  the  narrow  scope  (=  "non-specific")  indefinites  as  "dependent  indefinite".  Thus, 
according to Farkas, dependent indefinites are non-specific. In  my view,  they can he specific if they 
co-vary with the value of an extensional operator like in (43) (see seclion 6 helow). Specificity and Definiteness in Sentence and Discoursc Structure 
dependent  choice functions for the referential  reading of  the indefinite article; Geurts 
(2001) proposes accommodation for discourse semantics approach. 
5.1.  Quantifiers and pragmatics I 
The classical theory of NPs (Frege, Russell, Montague) translates definite and indefinite 
NPs  into quantifiers:  indefinite NPs  are existential  quantifier  phrases,  while  definite 
NPs are translated into a complex quantifier phrase expressing uniqueness of the object 
that falls under the description. Thus, the difference between indefinite and definite NPs 
is semantically expressed in the uniqueness condition. This was the background of this 
classical theory, as the notion of specificity was introduced in the late 60s. When the de 
re-de dicto ambiguity of  definite NPs was applied to indefinite NPs, a similar contrast 
appeared  in  the  context  of  verbs  of  propositional  attitudes,  negation,  questions, 
conditionals, modals, future, and  intensional  verbs (see Jackendoff  1972). I illustrate 
this on the interaction from negation and NPs in (44)-(47): 
(44)  William didn't see the book -  until he saw it in the finis africae. 
a.  Vx 3y [book(y) -> x = y & -See(william,  x)] 
(45)  William didn't see the hook  -he began to wonder if there is one 
a.  7Vx 3y [book(y) -> x = y & See(william, x)] 
(46)  William didn't see a book from the finis africae -  until he saw it in the hands of 
Jorge de Burgos. 
a.  3y [book(y) & ~See(william,  x)] 
(47)  William didn't see a book -  so he knew that they had removed all books. 
a.  73y [book(y) See(william, x)] 
Epistemic  specificity,  as  in  (48),  is  explained  by  pragmatic  principles.  The 
characterization  of  specific NPs as "the  speaker as  the referent  in  mind"  is of purely 
pragmatic  grounds - in  the  course of  discourse,  the  speaker  and  hearer  might  get 
sufficient descriptive material  in order to be able to uniquely identify the indefinite NP 
(cf. Neale 1990, Ludlow & Neale 199 I). 
(48)  A book is missing from my library. 
This  view  was  disputed  by  Jackendoff  (1972)  and  Fodor  (1970). They  argued  that 
specificity  cannot  be  explained  in  terms  of  quantifier  scope - there  must  he  an 
additional structure, what Jackendoff calls "modal structure". However, they had not the 
appropriate means to describe this structure in an adequate way. 
5.2.  Lexical ambiguity approach 
Fodor & Sag (1982) propose a lexical ambiguity of  the indefinite article, giving up a 
uniform analysis of indefinites. Indefinites have either a specific or referential reading or 
they have a non-specific or existential reading. They assume that the contrast between 
the  two readings  is  incommensurable.  They illustrate this  point  by  the  interaction  of 
indefinites with quantifiers as in  (49). The indefinite has either a specific reading or a 
non-specific  reading. The classical approach  to this contrast  is by  means of different Klaus von Heusinger 
scope: the indefinite NP can get wide or narrow scope with respect  to the definite NP 
the rumor, reflecting the specific and non-specific reading, respectively. However, the 
universal  phrase  each  student  in  (50)  cannot  receive  wide  scope  due  to  an  island 
constraint. Thus,  the  specific  reading  in  (49) cannot  be  described  by  a  wide  scope 
existential quantifier. Fodor & Sag propose that the indefinite NP is either interpreted as 
a  referring  expression  or  as  an  existential  quantifier.  The  referring  expression  is 
scopeless  like proper  names  and  demonstratives,  i.e.  it  behaves  as  if  it  always  had 
widest scope, as in (49b). The quantificational interpretation, as in  (49a), must observe 
island constraint like other quantifiers and accounts here for the non-specific reading. 
(49)  John overheard the rumor that a student of mine had been called before the 
dean. 
a.  the rumor > there is a student 
b.  a certain student .> the rumor ... he ... 
(50)  John overheard the rumor that each student of mine had been called before the 
dean. 
a.  the rumor > each student 
b.  *each student > the rumor 
The theory makes a clear prediction: an  indefinite is  interpreted  either as a referential 
term and always receives widest scope, or as an existential quantifier, which has to obey 
scope islands. We can now test this prediction on examples with two quantifiers as in 
(49)  or (51). In  both  sentences, there are two quantifiers beside  the indefinite, which 
stands in  a scope island. According to Fodor & Sag's  theory, we would only expect a 
narrow scope reading by the existential interpretation and a wide scope reading by the 
referential  interpretation,  but  no  intermediate  reading.  While  judgements  on 
intermediate readings are quite intricate, Farkas (1981) observed on examples, like (51), 
that intermediate readings are often very natural. (51) has a reading according to which 
for  each  student there  is  one condition  such  that  the  student  comes  up  with  three 
arguments against the condition. 
(5  1)  Each student has to come up with three arguments that show that some condition 
proposed by Chomsky is wrong. 
a.  each student > some condition > three arguments ... 
The intermediate reading (52a) of (52) clearly states that even such a radical theory of 
ambiguity cannot exhaustively describe the flexibility of indefinite NPs. 
Kratzer  (1998) defends the lexical  ambiguity hypothesis of  Fodor & Sag (1982). She 
assumes  that an  indefinite NP is either represented as an  existential quantifier, which 
obeys island constraints, or as a choice function J; which is bound by the context and, 
therefore, has widest scope. A choice functionf'or 0  is a function that assigns to a set 
one of its elements. In other words a choice function "selects" one element out of the set 
that is expressed by the descriptive material. Following von  Heusinger (1997, 2000) I 
represent indefinite NPs as indexed epsilon terms, as illustrated in  (52). The reason for 
this is to distinguish between the logical representation (epsilon terms) and the semantic 
interpretation (choice functions). The epsilon operator is interpreted as a choice function Specificity and Definiteness in Sentence and Discourse Structure 
that assigns one element to each set."  In  other words, the  referent of an indefinite NP 
is found by selecting one element out of  the set that  is described by  the description. 
Kratzer assumes that the choice function is always anchored in the context of utterance, 
here  indicated  with  speuker.  However, the  intermediate  reading  is  created  by  the 
dependence of descriptive content of the indefinite from  the  value  for professor.  The 
extension  of  the  set  of  books  recommended  by  x co-varies  with  the  value  of  x for 
professor. The choice function picks different elements from different sets. Note that the 
set of  recommended  books can contain more than one book.  It  is the choice function 
that singles out one element: 
(52)  a condition:  E~X  [condition(x)] 
a.  [[E~x  [condition(x)]]] = @([[condition]]) 
b.  @([[condition]]) E  ([[condition]]) 
(53)  Every professor rewarded every student who read a book he had recommended 
a.  Vx[prof(x) --t Vy[stud(y) & read(y, &speaker~[b~~k(~)  & rec(x, z)]) 4 
rew(x, y)ll 
h.  Ila  book he had recommendedll = eSpeak,,z[book(z)  & rec(x, z)]) 
There are two problems with this account (cf. the discussion  in Winter  1997 and von 
Stechow 2000). First, Farkas (1981) showed with examples like (51) that intermediate 
readings are possible even without variables in the indefinite NP. This problem can be 
accommodated if  one assumes that additional material can be copied into the descrivtion 
of the indefinite NP (here: some condition x,find.s dzficult). Second, if the set described 
by the descriptive material of the indefinite is extensionally equivalent for two different 
choices of  p;ofessors  in  (54a), the representation counter-intuitively predicts that they 
invite the same lady. Kratzer (1998), therefore, modifies her approach and indexes the 
choice function  (here the epsilon  operator) with  the variable x that  is bound  by  the 
universal  quantifier. She now can predict that depending on the professor  x, the choice 
from extensional similar sets can be different. 
(54)  Every professor invited a lady he knew 
a.  Vx [prof(x) 4  invite(x, ~~~~~k~~~[~ady(y)  & know(x,y)l))l 
b.  Vx  [prof(x) 4  invite(x, &,y[lady(y) & know(x,y)]))J 
5.3.  Quantifiers and pragmatics I1 
An alternative way to handle the mentioned problems is taken by Schwarzschild (2000) 
who keeps to the classical picture described in section 5.1. He investigates the properties 
of unique indefinite NPs or "singleton  indefinites", such as in (55). 
(55)  Everyone at the party voted to watch a movie that Phi1 said his favorite. 
"  Choice functions have recently become  a fashionable tool  for representing  indefinites  (cf. Kratzer 
1998, Wintcr  1997, von Stechow 2000, von Heusinger 2000 among others). We use the epsilon ope- 
rator  as  the  syntactic  representation  of  the  indefinite  article,  while  the  choice  function  is  the 
corresponding semantic function. Klaus von Heusinger 
Schwarzschild argues that the wide scope reading of  the indefinite NP in  (55) derives 
from the fact that its descriptive material uniquely describes one object. He then claims 
that  all  "referential  indefinites"  (or "specific  indefinites")  are singleton indefinites. In 
other  words,  it  is just  the  descriptive  material  that  causes  the  "feeling"  of  different 
scopes.  He  has  to  assume  additionally  implicit  quantifier  domain  restrictions  - 
something that is necessary for other quantifiers, anyway. A restriction can also include 
variables that are bound by other quantifiers in the sentence. He uses this mechanism to 
account for the intermediate reading (56a) of sentence (56). By domain restriction with 
the additional material that they have worked on most extensively the indefinite uniquely 
describes a problem for each or the linguists (assuming all of  them are working on at 
least one problem). Thus the indefinite some problem  behaves as  having wider scope 
than ever,>  analy.ris It  is interesting to note that the same mechanism of adding a variable 
to descriptive material  of  the indefinite is used to "widen"  the scope (Schwarzschild) 
and to make the scope more narrow (Kratzer above). Schwarzschild is able to explain 
the  different  scope  "behavior"  of  the  indefinite  NP  by  assuming  different  domain 
restrictions on the indefinite that can stay in  situ: none for the narrow scope reading, a 
restriction with a variable bound  by most linguists for the intermediate reading, and a 
restriction somehow connected to the speaker or to more encyclopedic knowledge. 
(56)  Most linguists have looked at every analysis that solves some problem. 
a.  Most linguists -  some problem -  every analysis 
(56')  Most linguists have looked at every analysis that solves some problem that they 
have worked on most extensively 
(56)  b.  Most linguists  ...  every analysis ... some problem 0  narrow scope 
c.  Most linguists ... every analysis ... some problem that 
they have worked on most extensively 
intermediate 
d.  Most linguists ... every analysis ... some 
problem that I  find  most difficult 
that Chomsb  had announced that it is solve  wide scope 
I cannot evaluate this approach in detail, but I would like to hint at some problems: (i) 
the domain restriction always ends up with a uniquely identifying description -  a simple 
domain  restriction  like  that they like would not do. It  is not so clear why  we need 
singletons  in  examples  like  (51)  above.  Furthermore,  the  uniqueness  condition  for 
indefinites  seems to  be  even more disastrous than  for definites. Lewis  (1979), Heim 
(19821, Reimers (1992) among others have convincingly shown that domain restriction 
to uniques  is  not  always possible  for definite NPs.  Second, it  is  not  clear what  the 
difference  between  a  definite NP  and  an  indefinite  NPs  is  if  not  uniqueness  in  the 
classical picture. Schwarzschild would answer that it is familiarity from the discourse 
representation theory, yet it is not clear what the theoretical framework is after all. 
A  related  approach  is  proposed  by  Yeom  (1998,  71),  who  models  the  "generally 
accepted intuition of specificity is that the speaker has something in mind." He extends 
the semantics of indefinites as existential quantifiers by  an additional two place relation 
hccw for has cognitive contact with . One place is filled by the variable bound by  the 
existential  quantifier  and the other must be  salient in  the  local environment (e.g. the 
speaker or the subject of  the sentence). The adjective a certain in English is the overt Specificity and Definiteness in Scntencc and Discourse Structure 
expression for this  relation,  however, specific  indefinites  without  a  certain  do also 
express  this  relation.  Thus, he  can  account  for cases of  relative  specificity  (see 4.4 
above) in  the following  way  (1998, 73). Sentence (57) has two readings:  in  reading 
(57a), there is one woman  such that every Englishmen adores her -  here the cognitive 
contact is licensed by  the speaker. In  the second reading, every Englishman  adores a 
certain  woman  - his  mother  (everyone  potentially  a  different  woman).  Here  the 
cognitive contact is licensed by the variable x for Englishman. Thus, woman co-varies 
with Englishman. 
(57)  Every true Englishman adores a certain woman -his mother. 
Note that it is the same strategy as employed by  Kratzer and Schwarzschild: inserting a 
variable into the descriptive material of  the indefinite, the extension of  the descriptive 
material co-varies with the value for the variable. However, in  Yeom's  approach, there 
is no restriction on the set that fulfills the descriptions -  there could be different woman 
an  Englishman  adores.  Therefore,  the  existential  quantification  looks  more  like  a 
partitive  constmction,  discussed  in  section  4.3 (one  of  the  woman  he has  cognitive 
contact  with).  Remember, Kratzer prevents  such problems  by  using choice functions 
and  Schwarzschild  by  assuming  a  uniquely  identifying  description.  If  we  modify 
Yeom's  approach  towards  Schwarzschild's,  all  the  problems  discussed  with 
Schwarzschild  arise:  (i) uniqueness  is  already  problematic  for  definite  NPs,  (ii)  if 
specific indefinites are also uniques, what is the difference from definite NPs then? 
5.4.  Discourse representation 
Discourse representation  theories  (Karttunen  1976, Heim  1982, Kamp  1981) assume 
that NPs are represented as discourse referents associated with their descriptive material 
(or:  as variables  that  are  associated with  sentences). So NPs  do not  refer  directly to 
individuals but  to discourse  referents. The distinction between  definite and indefinite 
NPs  is  that  of  familiarity:  a  definite expression  receives a  discourse  referent  that  is 
linked  to  an  already  established  discourse  referent,  while  an  indefinite  receives  a 
discourse referent that is not or cannot linked. Discourse referents of indefinite NPs are 
always  inserted  into  the  current  discourse  domain  or  box  while  referential  terms 
introduce their discourse referents in the main box. 
Kamp & Reyle (1993, 290) assume with Fodor & Sag that specific indefinite NPs are 
referring terms like proper names "Specifically  used indefinites act as referring  terms, 
terms that are used to refer to particular things, whose identity is fixed independently of 
the context in which the term occurs." Intermediate readings are represented by placing 
the discourse referent for the indefinite NP into some higher box -  the exact rules for 
this are not given. They neither state conditions that restrict this assumed flexibility. 
Geurts  (2001) explains  specificity  in  terms  of  backgrounding.  He  assumes  that 
"Background material  tends to float up towards the main DRS." Indefinite NPs are not 
ambiguous between a specific and non-specific reading; they always introduce variables 
and  associated  predicates.  The  predicates  are  inserted  into  the  discourse  structure 
according to  their  background  status. This  seems like  another version  of  the  scope 
theory discussed above, even though the predictions are somewhat different. Klaus von Heusingct 
To  summarize,  there  have  been  basically  two  ways  to  model  relative  specific 
indefinites: In the pragmatic approach, domain restriction is used to produce a singleton 
set corresponding to the indefinite NP. In the lexical ambiguity view, choice functions 
are replacing a referential operator and they can depend on other linguistic expressions. 
Choice  function  naturally  glve  one  individual  to  each  set.  However,  here  a  lexical 
ambiguity between  specific  and  non-specific NPs  are  as\umed. In  the next section, I 
preset a unified approach. 
6.  Specificity as referential anchoring 
The main assumption of my proposal is that indefinite NPs are translated into indexed 
epsilon terms. The index on the epsilon term is free. It can either be bound by operators 
like  negation  or the  textual  closure  resulting  in a  non-specific  reading,  or  it  can  be 
anchored to another discourse item such as the speaker or the subject of the sentence. In 
the following, I give a brief sketch of my model. 
Following von Heusinger (1997, 2000) we represent indefinite NPs as indexed epsilon 
terms, as illustrated in (58): 
(58)  a book:  &ix  [book(x)J 
The epsilon operator is interpreted as a choice function that assigns one element to each 
set (see above (52)-(53)). In  other words, the  referent of  an  indefinite NP is found by 
the operation of  selecting one element out of the set that is described by the description. 
The selection depends on the context in which the indefinite is located. This treatment is 
similar  to  that  of  discourse  representation  theories  (Heim  1982; Kamp  1981), where 
indefinites introduce new  individual  variables  or discourse referents. One of  the main 
advantages of using choice function variables instead is the following: Indefinites need 
not be moved or raised for expressing different dependencies. 
This approach  differs from other approaches using choice functions  (Winter  1997, 
Kratzer  1998) in at least two respects. Winter (1997) assumes that the choice function is 
existentially bound  at some level. He would only describe specific indefinite NPs by 
scope  interactions,  anything  else  is  pragmatics.  Thus  he  stands  in  the  pragmatic 
approach  to  specificity  (see  section  5.1).  Kratzer,  on  the  other  side,  assumes  two 
different representations of indefinite NPs: either as choice functions (specific reading) 
or  as  existential  quantifiers  (non-specific  reading).  I  assume  that  there  is  one 
representation of indefinites, namely as indexed epsilon terms. The index, however, may 
either be bound by  some operator such as negation  or existential closure, or it can be 
anchored to  some discourse item. So we can  analyze the readings  of  (59) as the non- 
specific reading (59a), and the two specific readings (59b) and (59c). In (59a) the index 
is  bound  by  an  existential  quantifier  in  the  scope  of  the  negation - therefore,  the 
indefinite has narrow scope with respect to the negation. In (59b) and (59c), the index is 
anchored to the speaker and to the subject of the sentence, respectively. In both cases the 
indefinite receives wide scope with respect to the negation. 
(59)  William didn't see a book. 
a.  73i  See(william, E,X  [book(x)]) 
b.  -See(william,  E~~~~~~~x  [book(x)]) Specificity and Definiteness in Sentencc and Discourse Structure 
There  is  no  difference  between  (59b)  and  (59c) in  terms  of  scope. However,  if  we 
replace  the  subject  with  a  quantifier  phrase  as  in  (43), repeated  as  (60), we  get  a 
different picture. (60a) is the representation for the relative specific reading, according 
to which the choice of  the indefinite depends on the value for man, while (60b) is the 
representation for a speaker specific reading -  here the indefinite has wide scope. 
(60)  According to Freud, every man unconsciously wants to marry a certain woman. 
a.  Vx [man(x) -> want(x, marry(x, &,y  [woman(y)])]  subject specific 
b.  Vx [man(x) -> want(x, marry(x, ~~~,~k~~y  [woman(y)])]  speaker 
specific. 
The same contrast can also be represented in the absence of any other operator, such as 
in  (61). Even though the two representations result  in  the same scope behavior of  the 
indefinite NP, they express a different referential anchoring relation of the indefinite. 
(6 1)  A book is missing from the library. 
a.  3i missing-from(&ix [book(x)], the-library)  non-specific 
h.  missing-from(~~~~~k,,x  [book(x)], the-library)  specific 
7.  Summary 
I argued that the pretheoretical characterization of specificity in (2) above as (i) certainty 
of  the speaker about the identity of  the referent, (ii) the referent is fixed, (iii) specific 
indefinite NP is "scopeless",  (iv) specific indefinite NPs are referential terms, and (v) 
specific indefinite NPs can be paraphrased by  a certain, can only describe a restricted 
set of  specific expressions. I showed on observations from Turkish that not all specific 
indefinites  fall  under  this  characterization.  The  discussion  of  recent  theories  of 
specificity  lead to a  similar result:  Specificity cannot be  described  in  terms of  wide 
scope behavior or in  terms of rigid reference. I argued that the reference of  a specific 
expression depends on the "anchor"  expression. Once the reference for the anchored is 
determined, the reference  for the  specific  term  is  also determined, giving a  specific 
reading of the indefinite. 
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